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NOTES
THE HISTORY OF NUCLEAR ARMS
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE SOVIET UNION
INTRODUCTION
I consider the problem of our satisfactory relations with Russia as not merely
connected with but as virtually dominated by the problem of the atomic bomb.,
The explosion of the first atomic bomb in August, 1945, cast a pall of
nuclear war over relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Since
then, stemming the tide of nuclear proliferation through extensive negotiations
has dominated the foreign policy of both countries. These negotiations consist
of a political "thrust and parry" with each country fearful of the other's potential
military or political advantage.
2
Two key factors affect nuclear arms negotiations between the United States
and Soviet Union. First, the negotiators must account for existing and prospective
weapons technology. "Each new weapons development has made it more difficult
to find a politically propitious moment to forge an agreement." '3 Second, the
negotiations are marked by what former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara calls an "action-reaction phenomena." ' 4 Each technological develop-
ment or advance by one side brings an new reponse or reaction from the other
side. Finally, leaders in both countries are subject to a multitude of social,
economic, and political factors that influence the negotiations process.
This note traces the history of nuclear arms negotiations between the United
States and Soviet Union since the advent of atomic weapons. It reviews the
agreements between the two nations and the bargaining process, as well as the
socio-political factors which influenced the negotiations.
The Birth of Nuclear Weapons
In August 1939, Albert Einstein wrote a letter to President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt stating that "[t]he element uranium may be turned into a new and
important source of energy in the immediate future... and it is conceivable..
1. Former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, September 11, 1945, quoted in C. ROBERTS, THE
NUCLEAR YEARS 9 (1970).
2. Id. at 6. "[Tlhe following account is replete with offer and rejection, proposal and counter
proposal ... both in serious effort and in propaganda intent. Positions long and stubbornly
held have been suddenly reversed and well-meant offers have been altered or withdrawn.
Id.
3. Id. at 5.
4. Id. at 6. "Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin: 'The United States must realize that in both physics
and politics each action causes a corresponding counteraction.' " Id.
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.that extremely powerful bombs of a new type may be constructed." ' Einstein's
letter marked the beginning of the nuclear arms race. That race, however, was
not between the United States and the Soviet Union. Initially, American leaders
feared the development and use of the atomic bomb by Nazi Germany.
6
In July 1945, the Allies successfully tested a nuclear device developed
primarily by scientists exiled from Hitler's Europe. 7 Although the U.S. no longer
feared Nazi Germany's use of the bomb,8 the war in the Pacific continued. 9
President Harry S Truman decided to use the new weapon as soon as possible. 0
The American arsenal, however, contained only three atomic weapons. Truman
knew that the American military would be forced to invade Japan if the bomb
failed to achieve its desired effect." Accordingly, two Japanese industrial cities
were targeted. On August 6, 1945, the first atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima.
Three days later, a second device destroyed Nagasaki; Japan surrendered and
World War II ended.
U.S. Monopoly of Nuclear Weapons
On January 24, 1946, the United Nations General Assembly passed its first
resolution which established the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.'
2
5. HARvARD NUCLEAR STUDY GROUP, LIVING WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS 72 (1983) [hereinafter
HARVARD GROUP]. In 1950, appearing on American television, Prof. Albert Einstein commented
on the decision to produce the hydrogen bomb.
"If these efforts should prove successful, radioactive poisoning of the atmosphere, and,
hence, annihilation of all life on earth, will have been brought within the range of what is
technically possible .... And at the end, looming ever clearer, lies general annihilation."
ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 8.
6. HARvARD GROUP, supra note 5, at 72.
7. Id. The U.S. program for development of the atomic bomb was called the Manhattan Project
and was led by Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer. Id. The test took place at Alamogordo, New
Mexico. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 10.
Oppenheimer was recruited to the Manhattan Project after serving as professor of physics
at the University of California at Berkley and the California Institute of Technology. Ironically,
Oppenheimer's security clearance was suspended by the Atomic Energy Commission in 1953,
following charges of disloyalty. See J. KUNETKA, OPPENHEIMER, THE YEARS OF RISK (1982).
8. HARvARD GROUP, supra note 5, at 72. Hitler took his own life on April 30, 1945 and the war
in Europe ended seven days later with the unconditional surrender of the German High
Command. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 73. Truman based his decision on several factors. "American policymakers wanted the
unconditional surrender of the Japanese regime responsible for the Pearl Harbor attack....
[A] planned invasion of the main Japanese islands was expected to result in as many as a
million American and many more Japanese casualties." Id. British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill commented:
[T]o quell the Japanese resistance . .. might well require the loss of a million American
lives and half that number of British .... To avert a vast indefinite butchery, to bring
the war to an end, to give peace to the world, to lay healing hands upon its tortured
peoples by a manifestation of overwhelming power at the cost of a few explosions,
seemed, after all our toils and perils, a miracle of deliverance.
W. CHURCHILL, TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY, 638-39 (1953).
11. HARvARD GROUP, supra note 5, at 73. American decision makers rejected using the bomb on
an uninhabited area as a demonstration for a number of reasons. They were concerned that a
demonstration explosion would not impress upon the Tokyo government the device's destructive
capability. They also feared that if warned of a demonstration explosion, the Japanese
government would bring American prisoners of war to the site. Finally, the U.S. thought that
an unsuccessful demonstration explosion would encourage the Japanese to continue fighting.
Id. at 72-73.
12. Luard, The Background of Negotiations to Date, FIRST STEPS TO DISARMAMENT 13 (E. Luard
ed. 1965).
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The Commission was to make specific proposals "for control of atomic energy
to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes" and "for
elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons .. ."3 Its membership
consisted of representatives from the U.N. Security Council and Canada. 14 From
the start, however, representatives of the East and West expressed divergent views
on the subject of disarmament. 5
At the first meeting of the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission on June 14,
1946, the United States submitted the Baruch plan.16 The proposal called for the
establishment of an international authority to license and control all aspects of
nuclear technology "from mine to finished product."' 7 The Soviet Union rejected
the proposal as an interference with national sovereignty.' The Soviets issued a
counterproposal called the Gromyko plan, after Foreign Minister Andrei Gro-
myko.19 The Soviet plan allowed the research and development of atomic energy
to continue under the supervision of each individual nation. Similarly, each nation
13. G.A. Res 1, 1 U.N. GAOR (7th plen. mtg.) at 257, U.N. Doc. A/12 1945).
14. Luard, supra note 12, at 14.
15. Id.
16. SENATE COMMTTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, SUBCOMMTTEE ON DisARMAMENT, 84TH CONG., 2D
SESS., CONTROL AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS A DECADE OF NEGOTIATIONS 1946-1956 at 4
Comm. Print 1956) [hereinafter 1956 SENATE report]. The plan was named after the U.S.
representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission Bernard Baruch. In presenting
the American proposal to the Atomic Energy Commission, Baruch warned:
We are come [sic] to make a choice between the quick and the dead. That is our
business. Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized
upon faith, can work our salvation. If we fail, then we have damned every man to be
the slave of Fear. Let us not deceive ourselves: We must elect World Peace or World
Destruction.
ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 3.
17. 1956 SENATE report, supra note 16, at 4. The international authority would conduct inspections
of nuclear facilities and impose sanctions for any violations. In addition, the decisions of the
international authority would not be subject to the veto of any single nation. Id. at 4-5.
Finally, the plan called for the destruction of all existing (U.S.) stockpiles of nuclear weapons.
Id. at 4.
18. Address by the Soviet Representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission U.N.
doc. AEC/8 (1946) reprinted in 1 DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1945-
1959 at 17 (1960). The Russians feared an international body composed of hostile western
majorities which operated free from Security Council veto. They also believed the Baruch plan
would help to maintain the United States' monopoly of nuclear weapons technology. Luard,
supra note 12, at 15.
[Tlo Stalin the Baruch Plan was nothing more than an American attempt to impose
on the world a nuclear Pax Americana, a device to relegate the Soviet Union forever
to second-class status. Stalin saw no generous offer; rather he probably suspected that,
in the end, the United States would not really relinquish its atomic weapons but would
manage to force the Soviet Union to submit to international inspection, thus laying
bare the terrible weaknesses of postwar Russia, and to fasten upon the world American
control of the authority to exploit, and reap the profits, the peaceful atom.
ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 17.
The United States grew suspicious of the Soviet's refusal to allow verification. President
Truman wrote to Baruch "[w]e should not under any circumstances throw away our gun until
we are sure the rest of the world can't arm against us." Id. at 23.
19. Address by the Soviet Representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission supra
note 18. The plan was named after Moscow's Security Council representative and deputy
foreign minister Andrei Gromyko. The Russian proposal, like the U.S. plan, also called for
the destruction of all existing stocks of nuclear weapons and a treaty prohibiting the future
use of atomic weapons. 1956 SENATE report, supra note 16, at 5.
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would be responsible for policing its own facilities. 20 The Soviet proposal was
unacceptable to the U.S. since it would allow the Soviet Union to continue their
nuclear weapons research with no reliable system of control or verification. 2' The
negotiations stood at an impasse and in January 1950, the Soviet Union withdrew
from the Atomic Energy Commission.
22
Throughout 1948 and 1949, the Soviet Union continually proposed a one
third reduction in land, naval, and air forces for all permanent members of the
Security Council. 23 The Russians also called for an unconditional ban on all
nuclear weapons. 24 The United States, however, relied upon its arsenal of nuclear
weapons to counter the Soviet superiority in conventional forces. 25 The U.S.
would not accept any proposal which maintained the Soviet advantage in con-
ventional forces while eliminating the United States' nuclear monopoly. The U.S.
nuclear monopoly ended in 1949, however, when the Soviet Union exploded its
first atomic device.
26
Growing Flexibility and Stalemate
The North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 created a negative
environment for arms negotiations. The United States realized "that, if [it] was
20. Id.
[T]he Soviet scientists whom Stalin had first put to work in 1942 continued their
secret effort to break the American monopoly on nuclear weapons. There is no doubt
that Soviet espionage helped the effort. Klaus Fuchs, the German-born British scientist
who transmitted secrets to Moscow, was among those officially present when the Nuclear
Age began at Alamogordo, New Mexico, in 1945.
ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 21.
21. Mackintosh, Soviet Preconditions for Disarmament and Arms Control in FIRST STEPS TO
DISARMAMENT, supra note 12, at 66. The U.S. also believed the Gromyko plan would eliminate
the existing U.S. advantage in atomic weapons while maintaining the Soviet Union's superiority
in conventional forces. Luard, supra note 12, at 16.
22. Mackintosh, supra note 21, at 66.
23. 1956 SENATE report supra note 16, at 6. See Soviet Draft Resolution Introduced in the Security
Council: Prohibition of the Atomic Weapon and a One-Third Reduction of Great Power
Forces, 4 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 2) at 74-75, U.N. Doc. S/1246/Rev.l (1949) reprinted in 1
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1945-1949 at 191 (1960). Following World
War II, the Soviet Union remained deeply concerned about the U.S. military presence in
Europe and in November 1946, for the first time, the U.S.S.R. "opened the question of
control of conventional armaments." 1956 SENATE report, supra note 16, at 5. The Russians
wanted to exert "pressure on the United States and Great Britain to hasten the withdrawal of
their forces which remained overseas .. " Id. at 6. The Soviet Union sought to capitalize on
popular sentiment which favored a worldwide reduction in conventional forces. In response to
this sentiment, the Security Council established the Commission for Conventional Armaments
in 1947. Security Council Resolution Establishing the Commission for Conventional Armaments
2 U.N. SCOR Supp. (No. 5) at 58, U.N. Doc. S/268/Rev.1 (1947).
24. Mackintosh, supra note 21, at 66. "The Soviet Union insisted that the question of atomic
weapons was so closely related to the reduction of conventional armaments that the two
problems could not be considered separately." 1956 SENATE report, supra note 16, at 6.
25. Mackintosh, supra note 21, at 67.
[I]n 1948-49, the Soviet land army consisted of 175 divisions, while the strength of
the United States Army was down to 12 divisions. Under the Soviet disarmament plan,
with no atomic weapons in the hands of the United States, with a much-reduced
Strategic Air Command and a tiny army, the whole of Western Europe would have
been at the mercy of the Soviet military power. It is likely that the temptation to occupy
the West European peninsula would have been too hard for Stalin to resist.
Id.
26. Statement by President Truman Regarding Atomic Explosion in the Soviet Union, 21 DEP'T
ST. BULL. 487 (1949). Five days before the Soviet test, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed
creating NATO. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 22.
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not always ready to make use of atomic weapons in response to conventional
attacks, effective disarmament proposals must cover conventional as well as
atomic weapons. ' 27 In an address to the United Nations shortly after the Korean
invasion, President Truman indicated for the first time the United States' will-
ingness to negotiate the control of nuclear weapons in conjunction with the
reduction of conventional forces. 2 Truman's proposal led to the establishment
in 1952 of a single United Nations Disarmament Commission which replaced the
Commission for Conventional Armaments and the Commission for Atomic
Energy.
29
A thaw in the Cold War tensions began in 1952 with a truce in Korea. The
election of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, followed by the death of Stalin in
March 1953, created a new environment for international negotiations. For the
first time relative parity existed between the two powers. During the early 1950s,
the United States substantially rebuilt its conventional forces while the Soviet
Union increased its nuclear arsenal, thus dramatically reducing the U.S. lead in
nuclear weapons. In November 1953, the U.N. General Assembly established a
new subcommittee consisting of representatives from France, Canada, the United
Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States to negotiate a private disar-
mament plan.3 0
In 1954 the British and French governments began to take a more active
role in arms negotiations acting as intermediaries between the two nuclear powers.
A joint Anglo-French proposal, issued in June of 1954, provided for the estab-
lishment of an international control agency. This body would supervise "first a
limitation on armed forces and expenditures, then reductions of armed forces
and conventional armaments and finally, prohibitions respecting nuclear weap-
ons." 
31
In May 1955 the Soviet Union accepted the Anglo-French proposal as a
"basis of discussion" and proposed several modifications. 32 The Soviet Union
called for an immediate freeze of all forces as of December 31, 1954, followed
by a gradual reduction to the quotas contained in the Anglo-French proposal.33
27. Luard, supra note 12, at 21. The West also began a "rapid acceleration of the rebuilding of
their conventional armed strength to counterbalance the Soviet and Communist Chinese forces."
1956 SENATE report, supra note 16, at 7. While the United States strengthened its conventional
forces, the Soviet Union pushed to close the nuclear gap. In 1953, the Russians exploded their
first hydrogen bomb, following the U.S. development of the same weapon the preceding year.
Mackintosh, supra note 21, at 67.
28. Address by President Truman to the General Assembly, 23 DEP'T ST. BULL. 719, 721-22 (1950).
29. G.A. Res. 502 VI 7 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952).
30. 1956 SENATE report, supra note 16, at 10.
31. Id. at 11. See Memorandum Submitted by France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland 9 U.N. DC Supp. (April-June 1954) at 21, U.N. Doc. DC/SC.1/10
(1954).
32. 1956 SENATE report, supra note 16, at 11.
33. Mackintosh, supra note 21, at 70. The Anglo-French proposal contained the following ceilings:
One to one and a half million men for the U.S., U.S.S.R., and China. 650,000 for the United
Kingdom and France. 1956 SENATE report, supra note 16, at 12 n.26. The Soviet plan consisted
of two steps. In step one the five great powers (Russia, France, China, Great Britain and
U.S.) would reduce their armed forces by fifty percent of the difference between current levels
and the ceilings established in the Anglo-French proposal. By June 1956, there would be a
gradual elimination of all foreign military bases. In step two the remaining fifty percent of
the reductions would be carried out commensurate with a complete prohibition on the use of
nuclear weapons. Mackintosh, supra note 21, at 70-71.
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During the reductions, all countries possessing nuclear weapons would discontinue
testing and only use existing stockpiles in defense of aggression under direction
of the Security Council. 34 The reductions in conventional forces would culminate
with a complete prohibition on nuclear weapons.
5
The Western powers found the new Soviet plan unacceptable since it would
result in a distinct Soviet military advantage in Europe.3 6 During the reductions,
any U.S. use of nuclear weapons to repel a Soviet attack in western Europe
would be subject to a Russian veto in the Security Council. 37 "NATO [the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization] would have disappeared as soon as the United
States bases abroad were dismantled in 1957."38
The U.N. subcommittee on disarmament ended its work in 1957 without
achieving any progress towards the reduction of nuclear weapons. Both the
United States and Soviet Union realized that "no method of inspection known
to science could detect with any degree of certainty the existence of stockpiled
nuclear weapons." ' 39 It was clear that future proposals would have to center
around reduction rather than the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Both
nations looked for further progress outside the political arena of the United
Nations .40
Throughout the late 1950s, both the United States and Soviet Union believed
air and ground surveillance were effective means to prevent a surprise attack.4 '
In October 1958, "experts" from the United States and Soviet Union convened
in Geneva at the Conference on Surprise Attack.4 2 Unfortunately, the two
countries had radically different views on the conference's purpose.4 3 The con-
ference ended in December, 1958 "without the parties having ever begun to
communicate effectively.'"'
With the exception of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, 4 the United States and
Soviet Union were unable to agree on any proposals governing the testing,
34. J. GOLDLAT, ARMs CONTROL AGREEMENTS 17 (1983).
35. Mackintosh, supra note 21, at 71. By 1957, each power would have a conventional army,
navy, and air force fixed in size by the Anglo-French quotas without foreign bases or nuclear
weapons. Id.
36. Id. "A 'freeze' of conventional forces as of 31 December 1954, would have left 28 Soviet line
divisions in Eastern Europe, backed by 60-70 in Western Russia, facing 16 NATO formations
of the same type. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 1956 SENATE report, supra note 16, at 11.
40. GOLDBLAT, supra note 34, at 19.
41. Luard, supra note 12, at 28.
42. Id. at 31.
43. Id. The Soviet Union's experts consisted of members from their Foreign Office and military.
The United States' representatives, however, were mostly scientists. Id.
44. Id. The Soviet Union sought political recommendations and proposed a nuclear free zone
extending eight hundred kilometers east and west of the border between NATO and the Warsaw
Pact. The U.S. representatives, however, had no power to consider "any substantive proposals
of this type." Id. The American scientists confined their discussions to the technical problems
surrounding the control and prevention of surprise attack.
45. The treaty arose out of an international cooperative scientific effort called the International
Geophysical Year (IGY). HOUSE COMhOTTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBcOMMITTEE ON ARMS
CONTROL, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND SCEINCE, 99TH CONG., IST SESS., HISTORICAL SURVEY
OF ARms CONTROL NEGOTIATIONs, 5 (Comm. Print 1985). "To avoid the possibility of Antarctica
becoming a scene of international discord, the United States on May 3, 1958, sent a circular
[Vol. 15:199204
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production, or use of nuclear weapons in the first fifteen years following World
War II.
Remnants of the Eisenhower Era
The last few months of the Eisenhower presidency set the tone for a chilly
Soviet reception of the new American leader, John Fitzgerald Kennedy. On May
1, 1960, the Soviets shot down a U-2 aircraft flown by Francis Gary Powers;
the Soviets caught Powers, who worked for the Central Intelligence Agency,
photographing various targets in the Soviet Union with an infrared camera. 46 The
incident prompted the Soviets to accuse the United States of an aggressive act
despite the Eisenhower administration's denials that the plane's purpose was
spying. 47 The Soviets, particularly Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, called for
an end to the use of U-2's over Soviet territory. The Big Four Summit Conference
collapsed when Khrushchev refused to meet with Eisenhower in Paris.48 Later,
the Soviet Premier beat his shoe on his desk at a meeting of the United Nations
to protest the U-2 flights.
49
Kennedy narrowly defeated Richard M. Nixon in the 1960 presidential election
and took the oath of office on January 20, 1961.50 Four months later, Kennedy
acted on the advice of the CIA and attempted to invade Cuba with the help of
anticommunist Cuban nationals." The purpose of the invasion was to liberate
note inviting the other 11 IGY participants to a conference to negotiate a treaty for the peaceful
use of Antarctica." Id. The conference produced a treaty signed by the United States, the
Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, Japan, South Africa, New Zealand, Australia, Argentina,
Chile, Belgium, and Norway on December 1, 1959. Id. See The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1,
1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71, reprinted in 2 DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1945-1949 at 1550 (1960). The treaty prohibits "any
nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of nuclear waste material.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra at 1551.
46. D. WISE AND T. Ross, THE U-2 AFFAIR 10 (1962). Powers' mission was to photograph what
appeared to be the construction of an inter-continental ballistic missile base. Second Lieutenant
Powers, commisioned in 1952 by the United States Air Force, joined the Central Intelligence
Agency in 1956 to execute reconnaissance missions in Soviet airspace. See id. at 9, 24-25.
47. See id. at 75, 79-80.
48. See id. at 141-60. The Big Four Summit was scheduled for May 16, 1960 in Paris. The leaders
involved were President Charles de Gaulle of France, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan of
Great Britain, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union and President Dwight
D. Eisenhower of the United States. The topics that were to have been discussed included
nuclear testing, disarmament and Berlin.
The four leaders met at the Elysee Palace on the morning of May 16. Khrushchev announced
that Eisenhower's June invitation to Moscow was cancelled and that no "productive negotia-
tions" would come from the summit due to the U-2 incident. Khrushchev wanted Eisenhower
to condemn the flights and to punish the guilty parties; in essence, Khrushchev wanted an
apology.
De Gaulle and Macmillan suggested a postponement of the summit, but Khrushchev left in
silence. Later, the Soviets held a press conference at their French embassy and read a
memorandum which requested U.S. cooperation in halting the U-2 flights.
49. G. SEABORG, KENNEDY, KHRUSHCHEV AND THE TEST BAN 23-25 (1981). The incident evidenced
the prevalent distrust that existed between the superpowers. Id.
50. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 53. "[Kennedy] had come to office determined to do what he
believed Eisenhower had not done-press hard for limited agreements." Id.
51. M. BascHLoss, MAYDAY 389 (1986). See also A. SCHLESINGER, A THOUSAND DAYS: JOHN F.
KENNEDY IN THE WHITE HOUSE 247 (1965). Schlesinger surmises, "[o]bviously no one expected
the invasion to galvanize the unarmed and unorganized into rising against Castro at the moment
of disembarkation [sic]. But the invasion plan, as understood by the President and Joint
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Cuba from communist influence, but it resulted in Castro's gaining 1100 hos-
tages.5 2 The Soviets reacted to the invasion with a show of strength in Berlin and
reinforcing military strength in Cuba. During the early 1960s, Soviet military
philosophy relied on the premise that the world would ultimately divide into two
factions, East and West. The Soviets also believed that in an all-out nuclear
confrontation, one side could prevail. 3 This was evident at the June 3-4, 1961
Vienna Summit in which Khrushchev and Kennedy first met face to face.5 4 The
Soviets, soon after the meeting, attempted to cut communications between West
Berlin and the West, effectively removing Berlin from the West's control until
NATO military convoys thwarted the Soviet efforts.5
Partly in response to the Berlin Crisis, Secretary of Defense McNamara,
who served under both Presidents Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson from 1961-
67, addressed the May 1962 NATO meeting in Athens concerning the Kennedy
administration's desire to substitute NATO's "massive retaliation" strategy with
a "flexible response" strategy 6 The NATO allies opposed the change, as it
seemed to suggest a willingness to employ nuclear weapons.57 McNamara explained
that the doctrine "[would confine] nuclear weapons to only two roles in the
NATO context: deterring the Soviets' initiation of nuclear war; and as a weapon
of last resort, if conventional defense failed, to persuade the aggressor to terminate
the conflict on acceptable terms."" NATO debated the flexible response strategy
for five years and adopted in 1967.19
Chiefs, did assume that the successful occupation of an enlarged beachhead area would rather
soon incite organized uprisings by armed members of the Cuban resistance." Id. Schlesinger
notes the "minimum objective" of the Bay of Pigs invasion was to supply and reinforce the
members of the resistance already on the island. See id. at 256. The United States trained
refugees from the Batista regime as officers for the invasion which was to begin with air strikes
from Nicaragua. The invasionary forces planned a landing en masse on the Cuban shore. Id.
at 234-36. However, Castro's army anticipated the landing and forced the would-be invaders
to abort the mission. Id. at 270-72.
52. R. McNAmARA, BLUNDERING INTO DISASTER 7-8 (1986). The CIA had been monitoring the
gradual strengthening of Soviet military forces in Cuba and had drafted a plan for the invasion
before suggesting the maneuver to the President. Id.
53. Id. at 13.
54. See M. BESCHLOSS, supra note 51, at 389-90. See also R. McNAMARLA, supra note 52, at 26.
Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara observed that Kennedy was apparently shaken
by Khrushchev's seeming indifference to nuclear confrontation. See also SEABORG, supra note
49, at 67. Seaborg comments, "Whereas Kennedy was appealed for a sort of global standstill
that would avoid changes that upset the balance of power, Khrushchev insisted on the Soviet
right to support wars of national liberation." Seaborg also quotes statesman Averell Harriman
as commenting that, "[i]t was the first time [Kennedy had] seen Khrushchev and he was very
much shocked, very much upset, shattered really, by this conversation in Vienna." Id. (Seaborg
was chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission under Kennedy).
55. Ulam, Forty Years of Troubled Coexistence 64 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 12, 18 (1985). Ulam concludes
that, "[the Berlin Crisis of 1958-62 was not prompted by the Kremlin's lusting for West
Berlin, as was widely believed in the West, It was the main feature of the design to cajole the
United States and its allies into agreeeing on a German peace treaty that would categorically
preclude the Federal Republic from manufacturing or possessing nuclear weapons (recognition
of the sovereignty of East Germany was another but rather secondary objective of the scheme)."
Id. See also ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 57.
56. McNAmARA, supra note 52, at 23-25.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 24.
59. Id. According to McNamara, the essential element of the strategy, building sufficient conven-
tional capabilities to offset those of the Warsaw Pact, has never been achieved. Id.
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On the Brink: The Cuban Missile Crisis
On October 14, 1962 a U-2 aircraft on a reconnaissance mission discovered
that the USSR had moved nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles onto the island. These
missiles had a range which included many East Coast cities. 6° The missiles'
purpose allegedly was to force the United States into recognizing East Germany.
6'
On October 22, 1962, Kennedy announced that the United States would blockade
Cuba to halt the continuing passage of Soviet vessels transporting military
equipment to the island. 62 Kennedy also revealed to the American public that the
United States would respond with nuclear devices to any attack launched from
Cuba. 63 At the time, the United States was well prepared to launch a first strike
against Cuba.64
The Kennedy Administration developed two possible approaches to the missile
crisis: one, destroy the missiles in an air attack and follow it up with a ground
invasion, or quarantine Cuba in order to prevent Soviet resupply of the island
until the missiles were withdrawn. The U.S. implemented the latter option
beginning on October 24, 1962.65 For the next two days, newspapers around the
world hinted at a possible U.S. invasion or strike against the missile bases.
66
Khrushchev, in later years, dismissed the world press' inferences that the Soviets
were challenging the United States to a nuclear confrontation. 67 Kennedy re-
sponded to critics of his adminstration's response by stating that he did not
believe the Soviets intended to instigate a "big war."
'68
From October 24 to October 26 Kennedy and Khrushchev exchanged secret
letters in which each leader put forth his perceptions of the crisis and suggested
60. Id. at 8-11. See also Address by President Kennedy October 22, 1962, 47 DEPT. STATE BULL.
715-20 (1962), reprinted in D. LARSON, THE CUBAN CRISIS OF 1962 at 59 (1986). The missiles
were capable of reaching Washington, D.C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral and Mexico
City. Id.
61. McNAsARA, supra note 52, at 8-11. McNamara suggests that [tlhere is a great deal of
circumstantial evidence that the Soviet missiles in Cuba were intended to be used for bargaining:
Washington would agree to a German treaty on Soviet terms as the price for withdrawal of
the missiles. And it is also likely that another part of the bargain would have had the United
States lifting its protective shield over Taiwan, the concession which Khrushchev hoped
(optimistically) would induce Mao to give up Chinese plans to acquire nuclear weapons." Id.
62. Cuban Crisis: A Step by Step Review N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1962, at 1, 6-7 reprinted in LARSON,
supra note 60, at 324-4 (1962). The idea of a surprise attack against Soviet forces in Cuba
was rejected on moral grounds. Attorney General Kennedy said that the United States attacking
a small country like Cuba without warning would "irreparably hurt our reputation in the
world-and our own conscience." Id. at 257.
63. See ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 60.
64. Eight Challenges for Arms Control, DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 30 (1984). The United States, in
the mid-1960's, had 1,000 ICBM's and 656 submarine-launched ballistic missiles in four nuclear
submarines. Id.
65. McNAMARA, supra note 52, at 10-11. See LARSON, supra note 60, at 253. The first option
would have left NATO members open to Soviet retaliation, especially in Berlin. Id.
66. LARSON, supra note 60, at 268.
67. N. KHRUSHCHEV, KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS (1970) reprinted in SOVIET VIEWS ON THE CUBAN
MIssILE CISIS 125 (R. Pope, ed. 1982) [hereinafter SOVIET VIEws]. Khrushchev commented,
"[iun addition to protecting Cuba, our missiles would have equalized what the West likes to
call the 'balance of power.' " the Americans had surrounded our country with military bases
and threatened us with nuclear weapons, and now they would learn just what it feels like to
have enemy missiles pointing at you; we'd be doing nothing more than giving them a little of
their own medicine." Id.
68. See generally SovIEr VIEws, supra note 67.
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possible concessions the opposition could make to resolve it. Kennedy's primary
objective was the removal of the Soviet missiles, while Khrushchev alternatively
requested a promise that American missiles would be removed from Turkey and
that the United States would not invade Cuba.69 On Sunday, October 28,
Khrushchev notified Kennedy that he would dismantle the missile bases and
withdraw bomber aircraft from Cuba. 70 The superpowers had flirted with nuclear
confrontation, but this time the United States succeeded in shaking the Soviets'
confidence in the ability to wage and win a nuclear battle.
71
The Test Ban Treaty
After the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev took the initiative in discussing
nuclear test ban agreements and did not escalate Soviet efforts in reaching nuclear
parity with the United States. 72 Khrushchev had left open the possibility of nuclear
arms negotiations in his October 27 letter to Kennedy during the missile crisis. 73
The American public, wary of atmospheric testing and fallout dangers, reacted
strongly when Kennedy permitted resumption of the testing in late 1962.7 4
Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk travelled to Moscow in August, 1963
and signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty. 7 Along with the Americans and Soviets,
the British also signed the August 5 treaty in Moscow. 76 The Senate ratified the
1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty by a vote of 80-19. 77 The treaty prohibited nuclear
69. Khrushchev's Mesage of October 26, 1962 reprinted in LARSON, supra note 60, at 47-48.
Khrushchev demands a promise: "If the President and Government of the United States would
give their assurances that the United States would itself not take part in an attack upon Cuba
and would restrain others from such action; if you would recall your Navy-this would
immediately change everything. I do not speak for Fidel Castro, but I think that he and the
Government of Cuba would, probably, announce a demobilization and would call upon the
people to commence peaceful work." Id.
Khrushchev's October 27 message is more accusatory: "You are disturbed over Cuba. You
say this disturbs you because it is 90 miles from the coast of the United States of America.
But Turkey adjoins us; our sentries patrol back and forth and see each other. Do you consider,
then, that you have the right to demand security for your own country and the removal of
the weapons you call offensive, but do not accord the same right to us? ... This is
irreconciliable.
I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you
regard as offensive [if] ... the United States ... will remove its analogous means from
Turkey." Id. at 51-52.
Kennedy did not respond to this message but instead responded to Khrushchev's October 26
letter, agreeing to remove the quarantine and to assure that no invasion of Cuba would occur.
Kennedy did note that, "the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the cessation of work on
missile cites in Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable, under effective
international guarantees." Id. at 56-57.
70. McNAmARA, supra note 52, at 10-11. The move apparently surprised Kennedy because the Oct.
27 letter appeared ominous. Also, the message arrived at a time when the Navy was forcing
Soviet submarines to surface near the Cuban quarantine line and the Soviets had shot down a
U-2 when it strayed into Soviet territory near Alaska. Id.
71. See supra note 54.
72. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 61.
73. See LARSON, supra note 60, at 55. Khrushchev stated, "I attach great importance to the
agreement in so far as it could serve as a good beginning and in particular make it easier to
reach agreement on banning nuclear weapon testing." Id.
74. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 64. Sen. Henry Jackson. (D-Wash.) proposed that the U.S. remain
ready to resume testing at any time in case the Soviets violated the terms of a test ban treaty.
75. LARSON, supra note 60, at 55.
76. Id.
77. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 63-65.
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weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and permitted




China's failure to sign the Limited Test Ban Treaty evidenced the growing
rift between the two largest communist nations. 79 China alleged that the Treaty
"was a form of Soviet-American collusion designed to prevent China from
becoming an equal superpower.' 's Chinese leaders had openly criticized Khrush-
chev in his handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis and alienated the Soviet leader."'
During October 1964 a new era of the nuclear age commenced with the
Kremlin's ouster of Premier Khruschev and China's explosion of its first nuclear
device.8 2 At the same time, the United States began to monitor closely the
communist faction in Viet Nam. 3 Suddenly, the keen nuclear race acquired a
new competitor- China.54
After Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963, President Lyndon
B. Johnson assumed responsibility for maintaining his predecessor's determination
to reach meaningful agreements with the Soviets. Secretary of State Rusk met
with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York for a series of frank
discussions about nuclear arms throughout 1966.85 On December 5, 1966 the
Soviets proposed what Johnson termed, "treaty language we could accept. ' 8 6
The process of negotiating toward the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons began with this truce on language.
In June 1967, the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War brought the Soviets and Amer-
icans back on to opposite sides of the battlefield. Israeli forces, backed by
American military support, attacked Egyptian forces on the Sinai border; Egypt
received its military equipment from the Soviets.8 7 Due to the Hotline Commun-
cation System established between Moscow and the Pentagon during the Cuban
crisis, Soviet Communist Party Chairman Kosygin and Johnson were able to
78. Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements 1982, U.N. Sales No.
E.78.IX.2. See Ulam, supra note 55, at 25. Ulam concludes that the Treaty, "was the furthest
the tempermental Soviet leader [Krushchev] got in his on-again-off-again search for a rap-
prochement with the United States." Cf. Collings, Treaty Construction: Integrating the Amer-
ican Approaches to Nuclear Arms Control, 1 B.C. INT'L Coma'. L.J. 197, 206 (1977). Collings
comments, "effectively, nations other than the superpowers were committing themselves not
to develop reliable atomic arsenals."
79. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 67. The Sino-Soviet rift began in 1960 when Khrushchev removed
all Soviet experts from China, which occurred shortly before the Soviet leader's trip to the
United States.
80. See id. at 65.
81. See SOVIET Vtaws, supra note 67, at 139 quoting Statement of the Chinese Government, Sept.
1, 1963, reprinted in W. GRIFFITH, THE SnIo-SoVIET RIFT 383 (1964). "Before the Soviet Union
sent rockets into Cuba there did not exist a crisis of the United States using nuclear weapons
in the Caribbean Sea and of a nuclear war breaking out. If it should be said that such a crisis
did arise it was a result of the rash action of the Soviet leaders." Id.
82. See SOVIET Vmws, supra note 67, at 111. Khrushchev was relieved by the Central Committee
on Oct. 14, 1964, of his duties as first Secretary and member of the Politburo. Id.
83. See Ulam, supra note 55, at 25.
84. See ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 67.
85. See L. JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE POINT: PERSPECTIVE OF THE PRESIDENCY 1963-69 at 477 (1971).
86. Id. at 479.
87. See McNAmARA, supra note 52 at 15. See also JOHNSON, supra note 85, at 297-303.
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speak to one another directly."8 Each leader called for a ceasefire; Israel vowed
in its June 10 communication to the White House that such a ceasefire would
be implemented. The ceasefire took effect June 11, 1967.89
It was not until June, 1968 that Johnson and Kosygin met to discuss the
possibility of a treaty once again. 90 On July 1, 1968, the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed in Washington, D.C. 91 The treaty
prohibited the transfer of nuclear arms by nuclear powers and committed the
non-nuclear weapon states to a self-denying pledge not to receive or develop
nuclear weapons. 92 Yet the treaty contains an escape clause in article X. The
article states that a party may withdraw on notice if the "supreme national
interest" of the party requires the withdrawal. 9 The treaty signalled the end of
the 1960s era of limited agreements.




One of the first moves95 in the direction of arms control came at the
beginning96 of the Nixon Presidency when the National Security Council undertook
a study to determine the strategic position of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union. 97 It became clear that the Soviets had accomplished a massive buildup of
nuclear weapons98 during the sixties 99 and that three specific strategies were
available to the administration to deal with a superpower partner.1'°
88. JOHNSON, supra note 85, at 298.
89. Id. at 303.
90. Id. at 482-84. Chairman Kosygin and President Johnson met at Glassboro State College in
Glassboro, New Jersey from June 21, 1968, to June 25, 1968. Id.
91. Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation, supra note 78, at 71. See also Ulam, supra note 55,
at 27. Ulam referred to the agreement as a "common sense recognition" of the realities of
the nuclear age. Id.
92. See Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation, supra note 78, at 72-76.
93. Id. at 76.
94. Winsor, The Nixon Foreign Policy: Toward a New Concert of Powers 50 FOREIGN SERVICE J.
No. 3, 8, 8-9 (Mar. 1973); Destler, The Nixon System: A Further Look, 51 FOREIGN SERVICE
J. No. 2, 9-11 (Feb. 1974).
95. Winsor, supra note 94. Winsor saw the Nixon arms control effort as the end of the bi-polar
political-military era that followed World War II: "The first term of the Nixon Presidency
has thus set the stage by clearing away the Cold War and the tenacious confusions which arose
during and after World War II."
96. See WILLRICH & RHINELANDER, SALT: THE Moscow AGREEMENTS AND BEYOND 78 (1974):
Unlike his predecessor, Nixon was not prepared to accept the bureaucracy's
definition of the strategic problems facing the nation or its prescription of a
single negotiating option. During the transitional period between the two admin-
istrations, the president-elect conferred extensively with his national security
adviser, Dr. Henry Kissinger, and laid out a sequence of planning and decision
making on strategic matters. It was clear from the outset that Mr. Nixon would
not be rushed into premature talks with the Soviet Union. An examination of
the U.S. strategic posture would precede the elaboration of an American diplo-
matic position regarding arms limitation.
97. See generally WELLRICH & RMINELANDER, supra note 96, at 78-80.
98. The Soviet defense system was also upgraded to deal with ballistic missiles. "Allegations
regarding possible improvements in Soviet air defenses to make them effective against ballistic
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The first stratagem involved the United States engaging in a directly com-
petitive buildup program.' 0' Traditionally, the technology of the U.S. focused on
miniaturization and strike force effectiveness, whereas the Soviets manufactured
bigger throw weight nuclear missiles which were less refined and utilized liquid
to a great extent rather than solid propellant. 0 2 Besides the differing technical
focuses of the two countries, the national pressure of an unpopular war in
Vietnam limited the United States' available resources to engage in an arms race
with the U.S.S.R. 03 Thus, the first option was not feasible for the Nixon
Administration, given the social pressures' °4 and technical logistics of the U.S.
nuclear development. 0 5
The second option available, ignoring the Soviet buildup/°6 was entirely
foreign to American sensibilities10 7 as the leader of the free world. 08 Soviet and
U.S. deployment of antiballistic missile (ABM) systems tended to grant first
strike capabilities to the nuclear superpower with the numerical advantage in
numbers of war heads.'1
9
The third option was to negotiate" 0 a cap to the arms race. The negotiating
posture of the Nixon Adminstration reflected the viewpoints of Administration
officials "' the public and the Congress." 2
missiles-the 'SAM upgrade' hypothesis-were now treated with a seriousness they had not
received in the Johnson years". Id.
99. Roberts, Moving to the Table 47 FOREIGN SERVICE J. No. 6, 17 (June 1970).
100. See generally Schapiro, The Nature of Soviet Leadership, 47 FOREIGN SERVICE J. No. 8, 24
(Aug. 1970); Kohler, Understanding the Russians, 47 FOREIGN SERVICE J. No. 8, 31 (Aug.
1970); Koburger, Jr., The New Order of Admiralty, 47 FOREIGN SERVICE J. No. 8, 34 (Aug.
1970) (Soviet Navy as a world force to be reckoned with).
101. Interview with William 0. McLean, Assistant Dean of the University of Notre Dame Law
School (member of the SALT I negotiating team for the U.S.) (Sept. 15, 1987). [hereinafter
McLean interview].
102. Id.
103. U.S. Dept. of State Newsletter No. 94 at 13 (Feb. 1969).
104. See generally Ferrell, The Merchants of Death, Then and Now 26 J. INT'L An:. 29 (1972).
105. McLean interview, supra note 101. See also, Roberts, Moving to the Table supra note 99,
explaining Nixon's reasons to deploy the Safeguard ABM.
106. See generally Jacobs, Soviet Strategic Effectiveness, 26 J. INT'L AFF. 60 (1972).
107. See Kahn, Dimensions of Foreign Affairs in the 1970's 46 FOREIGN SERVICE J. No. 2, 5 (Jan.
15, 1969); Krogh, Dimensions of Foreign Affairs in the 1970's, 46 FOREIGN SERVICE J. No. 2,
5 (Jan. 15, 1969).
108. Byrnes, Eastern Europe: The Unstable Element in the Soviet Empire, 48 FOREIGN SERVICE J.
No. 7, 31, 33 (1971). Byrnes discusses the characteristics of American culture in terms of a
U.S. diplomatic strength in the European theatre:
Our economic and military strength is so vast that we do not understand its
significance, while our power when added to that of our allies almost staggers
the imagination. However, our greatest strength is almost invisible, because it is
the social vitality, the effervescent intellectual vigor, and the freedom and openness
in which we live and face our serious problems.
Another strength of the United States and its European allies is their leading role
in introducing revolutionary scientific, technical, philosophical, and social concepts
into political and international life .... We therefore possess a tremendous
advantage over the Soviet Union, a most conservative society bothered by heresies
that it cannot master and fearful of change throughout its empire.
109. McLean interview, supra note 101. "Nixon saw a necessity for SALT because of the need to
put a cap on the Soviet buildup-to negotiate a ceiling." Id.
110. See Ikle, On Negotiating with Communist Powers, 48 FOREIGN SERVICE J. No. 4, 21 (Apr.
1971).
111. See supra note 107.
112. See Morse, Congress and Public Opinion in Foreign Affairs, 46 FOREIGN SERVICE J. No. 2,
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Beginning at Helsinki in 1969, and alternating between that site and Vienna
for close to three years, a team of approximately twenty negotiators" 3 for each
side constructed an agreement which is still in force today-the ABM Treaty. In
May of 1972, the Senate voted 88-2 to ratify the ABM Treaty.
Three other agreements, in addition to the ABM Treaty, comprised the first
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) accord: a five-year agreement limiting
strategic offensive nuclear missiles, and two executive agreements dealing with
early warning communications and a hotline between the President and the Soviet
General Secretary.
In recent months, some Congressional leaders have debated the legality of
research and development of SDI." 4 Two different interpretations have been
advocated due to the non-specific language of the ABM Treaty in regard to
research and development of defensive systems. President Ronald Reagan main-
tained that the interpretation of the treaty allows the testing and development as
well as deployment of the "Star Wars" shield. " 5
Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee, disagrees with the Reagan-Bush Administrations' reading of the ABM
Treaty and has threatened to withhold funds for the defensive shield if the
Administration continues to adopt a broad interpretation of the SALT I accord.
1 1 6
Fitting present day technology into the framework of previous arms agree-
ments which vaguely considered the possibility of modern arms systems is an
especially difficult task. 1 17 Indeed, the Strategic Defense Initiative should comply
112. See Morse, Congress and Public Opinion in Foreign Affairs, 46 FOREIGN SERVICE J. No. 2,
21 (Jan. 15, 1969); Irwin, Congress and Public Opinion in Foreign Affairs, 46 FoREIGN SERVICE
J. No. 2, 21 (Jan. 15, 1969); Lowenstein, Congress and Public Opinion in Foreign Affairs, 46
FOREIGN SERVICE J. No. 2, 21 (Jan. 15, 1969); Manning, Congress and Public Opinion in
Foreign Affairs, 46 FOREIGN SERVICE J. No. 2, 21 (Jan. 15, 1969).
113. Conspicuously, the United States chose not to use the United Nations as a forum for arms
control discussions. This decision comported with the overall philosophy of the Nixon admin-
istration to eliminate the bureaucratic input into the negotiating process. See Destler, supra
note 94, at 9-11. For a discussion of the impact of the United Nations on American foreign
policy see Rossi, The UN and American Foreign Policy, 46 FOREIGN SERVICE J. No. 5, 31
(Apr. 1969).
114. McLean interview, supra note 101. Dean McLean described three basic arguments which would
favor SDI from a negotiator's standpoint:
(1) SDI is a non-nuclear system.
(2) SDI theoretically gives the U.S. an effective defense by developing a superiority in
technology.
(3) SDI development includes the proviso for a transaction of technology between the
superpowers-sharing of information through negotiations which are not in isolation,
but within the overall scheme of arms control and disarmament.
Id.
115. In a Presidential Determination, Reagan stated:
Such testing would not constitute an irreversible step that would gravely impair prospects
for negotiations on anti-satellite weapons. Such testing is fully consistent with the rights
and obligations of the U.S. under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 as those
rights and obligations exist at the time of such testing.
Presidential Determination No. 85-19 (Aug. 20, 1985).
116. On September 17, 1987 this threat was manifested in a restrictive budget authorization
amendment which would bar the Pentagon from awarding SDI contracts to overseas bidders.
This amendment, sponsored by Senator John Glenn (D-Ohio) was adopted by a voice vote in
the Senate, and effectively undercuts the Administration's SDI development agreements with
major allies.
117. See generally A. THoSnsoN, GERAn) SMTH ON ARMS CONTROL, 217-248 (1987).
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with the provisions of the ABM Treaty-adopted more than fifteen years ago,
when the feasibility of such a defensive concept was quite remote. The importance
of the ABM agreement cannot be overemphasized." 8
Shaping the Negotiating Process"19
The SALT negotiations began on November 17, 1969 in Helsinki. The
American negotiating team operated under the close direction of the Secretary
of State and worked directly under the Executive Branch. 20 The week before the
talks began, Senator Albert Gore, Sr. (D-Tenn.), of the Arms Services Committee
was stood up by the chief administration negotiator on SALT, Gerard Smith,
who was prohibited from discussing the specifics of U.S. SALT policy with
Congress.' 2' The snub marked the first example of Kissinger-imposed secrecy
22
118. Id. at xiii-xxvii.
119. The intricacies of the negotiating process were described by Dr. Jerome Wiesner of M.I.T.:
I used to say when I was working in the White House that we were fighting a four-
front war when we tried to do something about arms limitations.
We had to deal with the Russians occasionally, but we had to deal with the Pentagon,
we had to deal with the Congress and we had to deal with the public; and I was never
certain which of these groups gave us more problems because we rarely go to deal with
the Russians.
We were mostly dealing with ourselves. The kind of treaties one has to enter into to
get into the position to negotiate with the Soviet Union were such, and I think they
had the same problem incidentally that we frequently had, that when things looked
very bad we would change the most controversial aspects. We sometimes suspected they
did the same thing, so we used to have a love-making game, I guess, in which one
tried to find out the point of flexibility in each other's postures....
Hearings on ABM, MIRV, SALT, and the nuclear arms race Before the Subcomm. on Arms
Control, International Law and Organizations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 405 (1970).
120. McLean interview, supra note 101. "Each negotiating session was supervised by the National
Security Adviser Henry Kissinger who helped to prepare specific guidelines for the negotiators
during the recess periods. The principle of operations for both sides was that nothing was
agreed until everything was agreed." Id.
121. N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1969, at 10, col. 1.
122. H.R. REP. No. 72, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-12 (1974):
In another area, the Secretary's [Kissinger's] administration of this negotiation process
deserves critical comment. A problem first suggested to the Subcommittee by Paul
Nitze, a recently resigned member of the SALT negotiating team, and buttressed by
other evidence as the Subcommittee's hearings proceeded, is that the U.S. negotiating
process has become-almost inextricably-intertwined in the personality of the current
Secretary of State ...
The situation which causes concern can be illustrated by a curious relationship that
currently exists in the SALT negotiations and has been characterized in terms of the
"front channel" and the "back channel" of negotiations. The "front channel" is that
represented by the forum in which the U.S. and Soviet negotiating teams meet to
formally present proposals and work toward an agreement. The "back channel" is the
personal negotiating that takes place between Secretary Kissinger himself, and the Soviet
Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko or even Secretary Brezhnev.
Of late, and including a large part of the negotiations that resulted in the Interim
Agreement, the "back channel" has produced all movements of substance in the
negotiations with the "front channel" fleshing out the details after the fact. The obvious
danger from such a system is that when Mr. Kissinger leaves his post, the U.S.
government will be left a series of personal relationships which govern the progress and
success of such negotiations, but which Mr. Kissinger's successor may well not be able
to energize. This could be unfortunate for the U.S.'s long term interests as it is apparent
that the duration of these negotiations and the critical questions they consider will
remain for an indeterminate time in the future.
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upon the Senate 23 that was to continue until after the final SALT accords were
signed in Moscow in May 1972.124 President Nixon publicly declared that it was
"vital that we recognize that the position of our negotiators not be weakened or
compromised by discussions that might take place [in Congress].
1 25
A lack of significant congressional knowledge about or involvement in the
negotiating process was apparent in the first 10 months of the Nixon adminis-
tration. Without informing Congress, various options for the U.S. SALT nego-
tiating team were formulated, and the governmental policy machinery on arms
control was set in place. 26 On January 21, 1969, the day after Nixon's inaugu-
ration, a National Security Study Memorandum called for the review of American
military posture.127 The study gauged the strength of U.S. forces vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union. A later study 2s directed the formulation of various options for
future strategic arms limitation talks. National Security Advisor Kissinger firmly
established his role in directing the SALT effort by forming the SALT Verification
panel in July 1969.129
The Verification Panel and its associated decision-making machinery allowed
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to shape the issues of arms control before
any significant legislative involvement could assess the situation.
30
U.S.-Soviet Negotiations
SALT opened with great ceremony in Helsinki on November 17, 1969, but
it would take two and a half years and hundreds of meetings, including direct
123. Kissinger operated almost exclusively through the SALT negotiating team which had at all
times "complete access to any relevant information with regarding to the United States and
Soviet forces." McLean interview, supra note 101.
124. Kissinger's role in cancelling the Senate briefing was reported in The N.Y. Times, Nov. 13,
1969, at 10, col. 1.
125. N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1969, at I col. 4.
126. The Department of State was only secondarily involved with the formulations of arms control
policy. Riemer, A Mission Unaccomplished, 48 FOREIGN SERVICE J. No. 9, 18 (Sept. 1971):
State's secondary role in formulating American foreign policy seems so evident that it
is difficult to understand why members of the press, legislators, Foreign Service officers,
or anyone else, raise the issue....
... President Nixon, unintentionally, but unmistakably, confirmed my premise at his
March 4, 1971 press conference. He said that the Secretary of State is the "adviser"
and "chief spokesman" on foreign policy, while the President's White House Adviser
Dr. Kissinger, "coordinates" foreign policy with national security policy.
127. NSSM No. 3 (1969). This memorandum aided the Administration's fact gathering process
about nuclear arms and led to the concept of strategic "sufficiency." The Nixon ideology
adopted nuclear sufficiency as the negotiating posture for the SALT I arms accords.
128. NSSM No. 28 (1969).
129. The Verification Panel analyzed each of the weapon systems which could conceivably be
involved in an agreement. It compared the effect of different limitations on our program and
on the Soviet programs, and weighed the resulting balance. It analyzed the possibilities of
verification and the precise risk of evasion, seeking to determine at which point evasion could
be detected and what measures would be available for a responsel White House Press Release
June 15, 1972.
130. The SALT decision-making process was summarized by William Van Cleave, former member
of the negotiating team:
In the preparation for and management of SALT, the White House retained the principal
role. Dr. Kissinger and his staff decided the work to be done, the issues to be addressed,
the agendas of inter-agency meetings and usually the wording of directives whether ad
hoc or in the forms ... memoranda.
Hearings on International Negotiations Before the Subcomm. on National Security and Inter-
national Operations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
221 (1972).
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intervention or "back channel communications" between Washington and Mos-
cow when talks stalled, to produce the Moscow accord of May 26, 1972. The
seven formal sessions alternated between Helsinki and Vienna. 3, The U.S. dele-
gation, appointed by the president, was headed by Gerard C. Smith, director of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). The other delegates were
Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson (succeeded by Ambassador J. Graham
Parsons) from the State Department; Paul H. Nitze for the Defense Department;
Air Force Lieutenant General Royal B. Allison, representing the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Dr. Harold Brown, president of the California Institute
of Technology. In addition, there were approximately twenty governmental experts
and advisers. The Soviet delegation was similarly represented by the power centers
of the Soviet bureaucracy.
During the second negotiating session of SALT in Vienna, the Senate tried
to influence the United States' position on the deployment of multiple indepen-
dently targetable re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs). This effort, which culminated in the
passing of Senate Resolution 211, proved to have little effect upon the Executive
Branch's control over the negotiating process. The resolution called on the
President to propose to the Soviets an immediate mutual suspension of the further
deployment of all offensive and defensive strategic nuclear systems. 3 2 Despite the
overwhelming margin of the vote (72-6), the executive branch was disdainful of
this resolution, which had no binding effect. 3 The Senate, though, felt that it
had discharged its duty of oversight.
3 4
Ratification
After SALT concluded with the signing of the Moscow accords on May 26,
1972, the situation of Congressional involvement changed dramatically, as the
President, seeking reelection, prompted a series of steps to insure Congressional
ratification of the treaty. On June 15, 1972, the President and Kissinger spent
more than two hours briefing some 120 Senators and Representatives on the
details of the agreements.' After the session, Senator Jackson of Washington
131. The sessions were in Helsinki in November-December 1969, Vienna in April-August 1970,
Helsinki in November-December 1970, Vienna in March-May 1971, Helsinki in July-September
1971, Vienna in November 1971-February 1972 and Helsinki in March-May 1972.
132. S. REP. No. 749, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
133. Nixon stated: "I think the resolution really is irrelevant to what we are going to do." N.Y.
Times, March 22, 1970, at Al, col.
134. Alton Frey summarized the views of many Members of Congress after the passage of Senate
Resolution 211 when he wrote: "The President now enjoyed the broadest reasonable mandate
to pursue a negotiated agreement of maximum scope. In realistic political terms the Senate
had done about all it could to spur diplomacy." FRYE, A RESPONSIBLE CONGRESS, 73 (1972).
135. Nixon emphasized Congress's role in the ratification process:
[Shince this is really an unprecedented situation, it seemed to me that it was important
that [Kissinger] appear before the members in this format. This is on the record.
... What we are asking for here . . . is cooperation and not just rubber-stamping by
the House and the Senate. That is essential because there must be follow-through on
this and the members of the House and Senate, it seems to me, must be convinced that
they played a role as they have up to this point, and will continue to play a role in
this very, very important field of arms control.
Hearings on the Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms Before
the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 114 (1972).
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seized the opportunity to voice his input and introduced an amendment to the
authorization of SALT which specifically called for equality in the arsenals of
the U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces. 13 6 Jackson's input'3 7 began a new era of
Congressional scrutiny' of foreign arms policy.3 9 The public sentiment against
defense spending during the Vietnam era (thirteen cents of U.S. tax dollar for
the Vietnam War' 4° and forty-one cents of U.S. tax dollar on national defense 1 ')
carried over to the post-Vietnam era and necessitated that Congress play a role
in missile reduction programs.
142
However, the Nixon system 43 of strategic diplomacy in arms control contin-
ued to function after the SALT accords on the basis of freeing negotiating
strategy from the bureaucracy of Congress. 144 Likewise, Nixon kept the domestic
pressures of student activism out of the formulation of the foreign policy
equation. 1
45
Destler commented that the Nixon-Kissinger system required three important
conditions to function effectively:
136. S.J. Res. 241, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
137. PLATT, TE U.S. SENATE AND STRATEGIC ARMS POLICY 29-30 (1978).
138. See Campbell, An Interview with George F. Kennan, 47 FOREIGN SERVICE J. No. 8, 18 (Aug.
1970) (explaining the reasons for lack of good communication between Congress and the Dept.
of State during the SALT negotiations).
139. See generally STERN, THE WATER'S EDGE: THE JACKSON AMENDMENT AS A CASE STUDY OF THE
ROLE DOMESTIC POUTICS PLAYS IN THE CREATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1976).
140. U.S. Dept. of State Newsletter No. 94 p. 13 (February 1969).
141. Id.
142. STAFF OF HOUSE Comm. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., Report on U.S. Foreign
Policy for the 1970's, 100 (Comm. Print 1973):
... Congress was, however, extremely concerned that even after the withdrawal of
troops from Vietnam the defense budget was continuing to rise.
Id.
143. Destler, supra note 94, at 9-11:
In the years before 1969, Henry Kissinger frequently expressed the view that only by
freeing themselves from bureaucratic encumbrances would foreign policy leaders in
modern states be able to accomplish substantial things. The major Administration
foreign policy achievements are a result of putting this concept into practice. The Nixon
NSC system had been partially designed and totally explained as a means of enhancing
the quality and responsiveness of the bureaucracy's contribution to foreign policy-
making. But it became increasingly, in practice, a vehicle for excluding or diverting the
bureaucracy while Nixon and Kissinger did the "real" business on their own ...
Kissinger handled the most critical negotiations personally, very often secretively, keeping
the rest of the U.S. bureaucracy in the dark. His one client was the President, who
was intimately involved in planning and directing these efforts, and who capped their
achievements with visits to Peking and Moscow.
Id.
144. Id. at 10. On August 22, 1973, President Nixon announced the resignation of William P.
Rogers as Secretary of State and the choice of Henry A. Kissinger to replace him.
... [Nixon] intends little change in the way he and Kissinger handle foreign policy,
and that he has made the move for a range of other reasons-a desire to reward
Kissinger and to eliminate the periodic embarrassment caused by having his Secretary
of State on the periphery of actual policy-making; the difficulty of getting another good
man to take the Secretary job as long as Kissinger remained in the White House; and
above all the desire to demonstrate renewed Administration vitality in the year of
Watergate.
Id.
145. See generally Lipset, The Effects of Student Activism on International Relations, 46 FOREIGN
SERVICE J. No. 10, 26 (Sept. 1969).
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Logic and experience suggest that the system works well when three conditions
are met. It is effective: (1) with countries which have strong counterpart leaders
with whom to cut deals; (2) in bilateral relationships which are limited in depth
and breadth; and (3) on issues where United States leaders can personally control
the policy outcomes about which they need to deal."46
The highly successful closed two-man system ended abruptly though, with
the Watergate scandal-raising important questions about the ability of United






SALT I, the first strategic arms limitation agreement marked a new era in
the US-Soviet arms negotiations process. This post-war arms control success was,
unfortunately, followed by increased tensions between the two superpowers. Soviet
involvement in the Egyptian-Syrian conflict with Israel, the civil war in Angola
and the Ethiopian-Somalian encounter assured that future Soviet-American in-
teraction would face obstacles.
4
The signing of the SALT I agreement in 1972 signaled the birth of SALT
II negotiations. It was the difficult task of SALT II negotiators to clarify the
uncertainties, resolve the questions and confront the problems left unaddressed
in the SALT I agreement. 49 The SALT II negotiations encompassed both a
qualitative and quantitative focus towards limiting strategic nuclear forces.1 50
Throughout 1972 and 1973, SALT II negotiations seemed to be riding on the
momentum of SALT I, the only concrete result coming in June 1973, with an
agreement to continue negotiations. 5'
On November 24, 1974, the blueprint for SALT II was established. Com-
munist Party Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev and President Gerald R. Ford signed
the Vladivostok Accord, a framework for the continuing strategic arms limitations
negotiations. 
5 2
146. Destler, supra note 143, at 11.
147. Id. at 10.
148. S. PAYNE, JR., THE SOVIET UNION AND SALr 85 (1980). Cold war pressures alienated the two
superpowers in the late 70's. Although the U.S. and Soviet Union both supported a withdrawl
by Israel from the occupied territories, a deep-felt reluctance by the Americans to work towards
peace with the Soviets placed the superpowers at odds over the Middle East. The Soviet-Cuban
interventions in Ethiopia and in the Angolan civil war increased American criticism of the
Soviets and their practices. Soviet military buildup and human rights violations weakened
Soviet-U.S. interaction and caused irreparable damage to the SALT II Treaty. Fulbright, SALT
II An Obligation or an Option? 2 AEI DEF. REv. 7, 13 (1978).
149. The SALT II Treaty outlined in more detail the numerical limits to be placed on strategic
nuclear weapons launchers, as well as qualitative limits on missiles. SALT II went further in
establishing restrictions on verification procedures and technological development. D. SCHROEER,
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE NUCLEAR ARMs RACE 384-87 (1984).
150. PAYNE JR., supra note 148, at 84. "The SALT II agreement consists of three basic parts: a
treaty to last until the end of 1985; a shorter term protocol that will expire on December 31,
1981; and a joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations."
W.K.H. PANOFSKY, ARMS CONTROL AND SALT II 67 (1979).
151. PAYNE JR., supra note 148, at 87-88. "In 1969 the negotiators had naturally started where
mutual agreement was most easily attainable: those areas covered by the SALT I agreements.
This left for SALT I the areas where mutual agreement was difficult or impossible to attain."
Id. at 84.
152. TESTS OF SUPERPOWER, EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS 35 (H. Gimlin ed. 1987) [hereinafter
1989]
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As the Ford presidency came to a close, the East and West superpowers
neared mutual acceptance of the SALT II Treaty.13 This progress, however, came
to a sudden halt with the inauguration of Jimmy Carter as President in January,
1977. The Carter Administration upset the negotiating balance achieved at Vla-
divostok by proposing deeper cuts in the number of strategic nuclear weapons.
54
Carter's attempt at gaining domestic favor through a showing of strength in
foreign affairs, failed to produce the desired results. The Soviets emphatically
rejected the new proposal.' SALT II, a compromise agreement, created internal
strife in the United States, between critics and supporters of the Carter Admin-
istration's arms control policies.5 6 On June 18, 1979, Carter and Brezhnev met
in Vienna to sign the SALT II accord. This step towards a renewed detente
between the superpowers could not, however, prevent the deterioration of U.S.-
Soviet relations which followed. 
57
Prospects for Senate ratification of the SALT II treaty steadily diminished
over the fall of 1979. SALT II could not survive three major political events that
fall: the discovery of Soviet troops in Cuba in September, the Iran hostage crisis
in November and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December. Each caused
irreparable damage to the already controversial agreement. President Carter was
forced to halt the ratification process. He faced deteriorating hope for future
progress in arms negotiations. 5 The pressure created as a result of conflicting
interests between the superpowers reversed the trend toward detente. 5 9
Gimlin]. Ford wrote of the Vladivostok meeting: "Let me say from our point of view, and I
believe likewise from the Soviet point of view, the goal of the negotiation . . . was primarily
to curb the costly arms race through a responsible limit, and eventually to reduce strategic
weapons." Remarks by Gerald R. Ford at the Faculty Seminar on International Security on
February 4, 1986, reprinted in UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE ON GLOBAL CONFLICT AND
COOPERATION POLICY PAPERS, No. 2, 2 (1986). Ford and Brezhnev were successful in establishing
limits on launchers and on MIRVs. The two leaders also resolved differences concerning the
Soviet Backfire bomber, throw weight problems and cruise missiles. Id. at 3-5.
153. SCHROEER, supra note 149, at 381.
154. Id. at 381-82. Carter's proposal included a 50% reduction in Soviet heavy missiles and a 58070
cut in MIRVed ICBMs. In return, the U.S. would cancel development of the MX missile. M.
KREPON, STRATEGIC STALEMATE: NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ARMS CONTROL IN AMERICAN POLITICS
90 (1984).
155. S.TALBOTT, DEADLY GAMBITS 219 (1984).
156. TECHNOLOGY, STRATEGY AND ARMS CONTROL 105-06 (W. Hanrieder ed. 1986) [hereinafter
Hanrieder]. When the story of the modified Vladovostok agreement with the Soviets became
public through a leak to the press, the Carter Administration faced an uproar by the
conservatives. A number of conservative organizations, as well as Senate and House Republicans
criticized the compromise and on a larger scale, denounced Carter's foreign policy itself. The
dissension threatened the hope for ratification of SALT II. Id. at 105-07.
157. Id. at 106-07.
158. Id. at 107. With all of the factors working against SALT II, Carter had no choice but to
withdraw the treaty from Senate consideration. Growing numbers of critics of SALT II
denounced the treaty, arguing that it left the United States vulnerable and at a disadvantage
compared to the Soviet Union. Edward Rowny, who had served in the SALT II delegation as
a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, even resigned to campaign against the treaty.
TALBOTT, supra note 155, at 220.
159. The arms control-detente connection slowly deteriorated with the close of the 1970's.
In the 1970's arms control was the centerpiece of the U.S.-Soviet detente relationship,
and arms control agreements seemed necessary periodically to punctuate the process and
to maintain the momentum of superpower cooperation . . . since 1979, however, when
Zbigniew Brezinski coined the phrase, the prospect has been one of "arms control
without detente."
A. Horelick and E. Warner III, U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Arms Control: The Next Phase, THE
RAND/UCLA CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOVIET INT'L BEHAV. 22 (Feb. 1986) [hereinafter
Horelick & Warner].
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The 1980's opened with a new U.S. administration and a goal of rearming
America .,60 Because of the deteriorating relations between the U.S. and Soviets,
the U.S. attitude toward continued negotiations was one of hesitancy and caution.
Officials in the Reagan Administration feared that superior Soviet capabilities
seriously hampered further interaction.1 61 Aggravating the strained relations be-
tween the superpowers was NATO's deployment plan; an attempt at securing
adequate defense in Europe and maintaining a deterrence effect coupled with an
aim towards renewed negotiations. 162
Strategic arms negotiations again became a reality in September of 1981
when Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
pledged to abide by NATO's 1983 deadline and "spare no effort" in reaching a
mutually acceptable arms agreement.
1 63
On November 30, 1981, the United States and the Soviet Union opened
negotiations with the purpose of limiting intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). 64
The U.S. delegation was headed by Paul H. Nitze. His Soviet counterpart was
Yuli A. Kvitsinsky.' 65 Because of the fragile ground on which arms negotiations
depended during the early months of the Reagan administration, neither super-
power was willing to concede or compromise with enthusiasm. ,66 While the United
States was demanding that the Soviets accept the "zero-option," 167 the Soviets
were holding out for a "freeze.'
' 68
160. Gimlin, supra note 152, at 36. During the Carter Administration, a roughly equal balance of
U.S. and Soviet strategic forces existed. With the initiation of the Reagan Administration, this
balance shifted and Soviet superiority became a perceived threat. The development and
modernization of U.S. nuclear capability became a priority. Grey, United States Nuclear
Weapons and Arms Control Policy in the Early 1980's, 4. N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L COMP. L.
387-93 (1983).
161. Horelick & Warner, supra note 159, at 3. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, at a meeting
of the Nuclear Planning Group in Brussels, "underscored the new Administration's commitment
to rearmament now, disarmament later, if ever." TALBOTr, supra note 155, at 46.
162. TALaoTr, supra note 155, at 33-36. In an attempt at uniting the U.S. and Western Europe in
the arms control process, NATO initiated a deployment package known as the "dual-track"
decision. The "dual-track" proposal provided that unless the Soviets accepted negotiated
limitations on their intermediate-range missiles, the SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20, by December 1983,
NATO would begin deployment of 572 Tomahawk and Pershing II cruise missiles. Id. at 35-
38.
163. Gimlin, supra note 152, at 38. The Haig-Gromyko meeting resulted in confirmation of
November 30, 1981 as the opening date for U.S.-Soviet negotiations in Geneva. Haig's Statement
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on November 12, 1981, 82 DEP'T ST. BULL. 16
(Jan. 1982).
164. 82 DEP'T ST. BULL. 30 (Jan. 1982).
165. Paul H. Nitze, the 74-year-old head of the U.S. delegation, was a veteran negotiator who
previously held posts in both the State and Defense departments. Nitze, a Democrat, served
as a member of the SALT I negotiating delegation but campaigned against SALT II. TALBOTT,
supra note 155, at 52-54. Yuli A. Kvitsinsky, at age 45, was a specialist in German politics
and arms control. Kvitsinsky served in the Soviet embassies in East Berlin and Bonn. Id. at
93-94.
166. Horelick & Warner, supra note 159, at 4.
167. Reagan's Zero-Option , a drastic arms reductions measure, called for the elimination of Soviet
land-based INF missiles. In return, the United States would not deploy its Pershing II and
cruise missiles. W. PARSONS, ARMs CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY 66 (1986).
168. The freeze proposed by the Soviet Union involved a unilateral moratorium on deployment of
SS-20 missiles by the Soviets in Western Europe. In exchange, the United States would have
to abandon plans for deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing 11's. The freeze also involved
a limitation on missile submarine operations. A Statement by Larry Speakes, Principal Deputy
Press Secretary on Mar. 16, 1982, 82 DEP'T ST. BULL. 38 (May 1982) [hereinafter BULLETIN].
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In February 1982, Nitze presented a treaty to the Soviets in Geneva which
proposed terms for the zero-option .169 The arms control objective for the United
States was curbing the perceived Soviet superiority. 170 The Soviets, however,
refused to accept a position as the subordinate military strength.' 71
Nitze and Kvitsinsky hoped to resolve the conflicting U.S. and Soviet
positions on INF through a one-on-one negotiation in a mountain range on the
French border. 172 Nitze knew that to overcome the INF impasse, the U.S. would
have to make concessions in the zero-zero proposal. 173 Nitze offered Kvitsinsky
an outlined agreement and the two sat on a log in the rain with paper and pencil,
hammering out modifications and amendments. 174 They returned to their respec-
tive countries with a renewed sense of progress. The U.S. and Soviet governments,
however, were not willing to endorse the "package deal." The plan was rejected. 175
In May 1982, President Reagan proposed the opening of START (Strategic
Arms Reduction Talks) negotiations in Geneva. This extension of the SALT
process was accelerated by pressure from the American public who demanded
that arms negotiations accompany the rearming process. 176 The U.S. representative
to the START negotiations, Lieutenant General Edward Rowny, 177 advocated the
philosophy of negotiation through strength.'17 His hard line approach was chas-
tised by those in Washington who advocated flexibility in the negotiating proc-
ess. 179
Difficulties in the framework for START prompted President Reagan to
initiate the President's Commission on Strategic Forces in January 1983.180 It was
headed by former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft.1'8 The Commission
169. President's Statement on Feb. 4, 1982, 82 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 50 (Apr. 1982).
170. Horelick & Warner, supra note 159, at 4.
171. Jacobson, The Crisis in Arms Control, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1601 (Apr./May 1984).
172. The "walk in the woods," an unorthodox negotiating encounter, was a means for the two
delegation heads to speak candidly, off the record and away from the pressures of formal
meetings. Central to the joint agreement was the freezing of Soviet SS-20's in Asia at their
current level in exchange for cancelation of the proposed Pershing II deployment. TALBOTT,
supra note 155, at 126-30.
173. Id. at 127.
174. Id. at 127-28.
175. Id. at 144-51. At a National Security Counsel meeting on September 13, 1982, Richard Perle,
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, led the critics of Nitze's
plan to victory. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger explained that the zero-zero proposal
and missile deployment plan would not be compromised. Id. Kvitsinsky met with an equally
negative response from Soviet leaders who condemned him for taking negotiations into his
own hands. The Soviets viewed the one-on-one meeting as a ploy, an insincere negotiating
tactic, lacking a genuine attempt at compromise. Id.
176. Horelick & Warner, supra note 159, at 3. At the start of the talks in June 1982, the U.S.
proposed a reduction in the number of land and sea-based missile warheads as well as a
reduction in the number of deployed ballistic missiles. Gimlin, supra note 152, at 39.
177. TALBOTT, supra note 155, at 314. Reagan viewed SALT II as a fatally flawed treaty and
promoted START as its replacement. Jacobson, supra note 171, at 1599-1600. Edward Rowny,
a SALT II critic was a negotiator who would ensure the Administration's demands. S. TALBOTT,
supra note 155, at 314.
178. KREPON, supra note 154, at 92.
179. TALBOTr, supra note 155, at 314.
180. Hanrieder, supra note 156, at 109. The Scowcroft Commission was established to review the
U.S. strategic policies, make recommendations regarding the MX-basing problem and refine
the START objectives." Id.
181. TALBOTT, supra note 155, at 303. "Scowcroft had been Kissinger's deputy on the National
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recommended greater concessions on the limit of the number of deployed ballistic
missiles. These changes were incorporated and the START negotiations contin-
ued. 1
8 2
President Reagan's START objectives included: significant reductions, equal-
ity, verifiability and stability." 3 President Reagan, realizing the need for conces-
sions in order to obtain these four objectives, proposed a "build-down" process
in October 1983 to eliminate older weapons and support the whole reduction
process.'8 4 A subsequent double build-down proposal refined the initial plan and
outlined a reduction in ballistic-missile warheads as well as standard weapon
stations.'85 The Soviets immediately rejected the double build-down proposal
which Rowny outlined in Geneva. The Soviets were suspicious and confused as
to which proposal the Americans were actually advocating and saw the double
build-down plan as prejudiced against their strategic forces.
8 6
As the date for the NATO-U.S. deployment neared, the INF and START
negotiations waned. The objectives of the two superpowers remained incompat-
ible. 8 7 The INF and START negotiations came to complete halt with the
installation of ground-launched cruise missiles in the United Kingdom and the
Pershing II missiles in the Federal Republic of Germany.' The Soviets made it
very clear that the missile deployment in Europe sabotaged any plans for further
INF negotiations.' 9 INF was the focal point of arms negotiations in the 1980's.'19
When it deteriorated as a result of the December deployment, the START
negotiations, with a significantly less stable framework, collapsed as well.' 9'
Stalemate
U.S.-Soviet relations during this period became increasingly uneasy.' 92 Wash-
ington had suggested that serious negotiations with the Soviet Union could only
be accomplished after the deployment of NATO-US missiles. 93 Moscow would
Security Council staff, Gerald Ford's special assistant for national security affairs, and a
member of Jimmy Carter's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control. He was also a
retired Air Force lieutenant general who had fought long and hard for the MX." Id.
182. President's Remarks on April 19, 1983, 83 DEP'T ST. BUtLL. 17-18 June 1983). The Scrowcroft
Commission recommended: modernization of U.S. strategic and ICBM forces, continued
research in defense and a dedication to arms control negotiations. Id.
183. BULLETIN, supra note 168.
184. KREPON, supra note 154, at 134-5. Republicans William Cohen and Charles Percy and Democrat
Sam Nunn strongly supported the build-down proposal as an alternative to the freeze and a
positive plan of arms reduction. The proposal involved the removal of older weapons in
exchange for the deployment of cruise missiles on more than a one-for-one basis. TALBOTT,
supra note 155, at 305-306.
185. Id. at 334-35.
186. Id. at 340-42.
187. Horelick & Warner, supra note 159, at 4. The U.S. demanded at least some missile deployment
in Europe. The Soviets rejected any deployment. This impasse lead to the Soviet walkout from
the Geneva negotiations in 1983. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 5.
190. PARsoNs, supra note 167, at 71.
191. Horelick & Warner, supra note 159, at 4-5. The Soviets saw no benefit in trying to salvage
the START negotiations which, after eighteen months, had failed to produce an acceptable
replacement for SALT II. Id. at 5.
192. Id. at 6.
193. Id.
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not comply with this prediction. 94 Each country vowed to hold a hard line: the
U.S. maintaining support for the deployed missiles and the Soviets demanding
their withdrawal as a key to reopening negotiations. 95 With little incentive to
resume negotiations, the stalemate continued. 96
In a move which further complicated the arms control environment, on
March 23, 1983, President Reagan proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI).197 From its inception, SDI became a controversial issue in the arms control
negotiation process. Of special concern was whether the program violated the
ABM Treaty.198 After the breakdown of U.S.-Soviet negotiations, SDI increasingly
became a program which weakened rather than stabilized the superpower rela-
tionship. 199
The unexpected changes in Soviet leadership during the early 1980's added
instability to the already fragile negotiating environment. Brezhnev died in No-
vember of 1982. His successor, Yuri V. Andropov died in February of 1984 after
a long illness. 200 Konstantin Chernenko assumed power in 1984 while the Soviet
Union and the U.S. remained in a negotiations stalemate.
20 1
During the early months of 1984, the Soviets continued their demand for
the removal of the U.S. missile deployments in Western Europe.20 2 The U.S.
responded with a willingness to negotiate but would not accept preconditions.
20 3
In addition, political rhetoric increased on both sides of the Atlantic with




In a speech on January 16, 1984, President Reagan urged a return to the
negotiating process. The Soviets, who were facing the death of Andropov, were
not in a position to revamp their negotiating policies. Moscow remained firm in
its demand for the withdrawal of the U.S. deployments as a requirement for
reconciliation 205
Negotiations Continue
The emergence of Konstantin Chernenko as the new Soviet leader offered a




197. SDI was conceived as a method of intercepting strategic ballistic missiles, with an additional
aim towards deterrence. Gimlin, supra note 152, at 41. President Reagan's "Star Wars" speech
was as much a surprise to his administration as to the American people. The space-based
defense program immediately became the subject of critical review. The Strategic Defense
Initiative acquired the more commonly recognized name "Star Wars" after the science-fiction
film. Some critics argue that the Star Wars program, like the film, is merely a fantasy and
not likely to succeed. THE STAR WARs DEBATE 5-6 (S. Anzovin ed. 1986).
198. Kennedy, Treaty Interpretation by the Executive Branch: The ABM Treaty and "Star Wars"
Testing and Development, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 859-861 (1986). Article V, paragraph 1 and
Agreed Statement D of the ABM Treaty contain provisions which may restrict SDI. Article V
involves the development, testing and deployment of ABM systems "based on other physical
principles." Id.
199. Horelick, supra note 159, at 7.
200. Gimlin, supra note 152, at 8.
201. TALBOTT, supra note 155, at 351.
202. Horelick & Warner, supra note 159, at 7.
203. A. Horelick & E. Warner III, U.S. Soviet Nuclear Arms Control: The Next Phase, TaE RAND/
UCLA CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOVIET INT'L BEHAV. 7 (March 1985).
204. Id. at 7-8.
205. Horelick & Warner, supra note 159, at 7.
206. Id.
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Soviets proposed a new round of talks centered of the prevention of space
militarization, a tactical maneuver to lift the emphasis off the previous demand
for withdrawal of the deployed missiles. 20 7 The U.S. replied affirmatively to
Moscow's offer but supplemented its response with an outline of additional
negotiation topics, namely strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons.
20 8
In late 1984, as the Reagan Administration began to embark on another
four year term, the prospects for U.S.-Soviet negotiations were gaining strength.
In November 1984, the U.S. and Soviet Union issued a joint announcement that
negotiations would resume in 1985 involving nuclear and space weapons issues. 2°9
U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei
Gromyko met in Geneva on January 7-8, 1985. Cognizant of the interests of
both countries, they established a mutually acceptable format for negotiations.
210
The nuclear and space talks negotiations were scheduled to begin on March
12, 1985 in Geneva. 2" With the opening of this new round of negotiations came
another change in the Soviet leadership. Mikhail S. Gorbachev became General
Secretary when Chernenko died on March 10, 1985.212
The Soviet delegation made very clear at the outset of the negotiations their
demand for a ban on space weapons and defense systems. 213 The American
delegation, headed by Max Kampelman, 214 fought to keep SDI alive. 215 Although
the Geneva Talks opened with accusations of treaty violations by both superpow-
ers, the delegations were determined to continue the negotiations.
21 6
In July 1985, a Reagan-Gorbachev Summit was announced. The Geneva
summit was set for November 1985.217 The meeting produced few tangible results.
Gorbachev reiterated the Soviet demand for a ban on space-based defenses while
Reagan sought continued efforts towards the reduction of nuclear weapons, in
addition to the development of SDI. 218 Both Reagan and Gorbachev instructed
their delegations to accelerate the negotiating process but neither provided solu-
tions to the issues hampering a mutual agreement.
21 9
Round IV of the Geneva talks opened in January 1986. Significant proposals
to be resolved by the negotiators in this round were initiated by the U.S. at the
207. Id.
208. Christol, An Assessment of Present U.S.-U.S.S.R. Arms Control and Disarmament Negotia-
tions' 13 J. SPACE L. 160 (1985).
209. 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. 74 (Jan. 1985).
210. Horelick & Warner, supra note 159, at 8.
211. Id. The U.S. and Soviet negotiating delegations were divided into three groups: Defense and
Space Arms, Strategic Nuclear Arms and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Arms. Id.
212. Mikhail S. Gorbachev gained almost instant popularity upon succeeding to the position of
General Secretary of the Soviet Union.
Gorbachev's popularity was closely linked to his energetic, charismatic, competent and
obviously intelligent personality and with the new role of television rather than with
the substance of his statements or speeches.
Z. MEDVEDEV, GORBACHEV 181 (1986).
213. Horelick & Warner, supra note 159, at 9.
214. 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. 34 (Mar. 1985). Max M. Kampelman was appointed head of the U.S.
delegation on arms control negotiations and U.S. negotiator on defense and space arms on
defense and space arms on January 18, 1985. Id.
215. Horelick & Warner, supra note 159, at 9.
216. Jacobson, Soviet-American Arms Control: Hope or Hoax? CURRENT HISTORY, 343-44 (Oct.
1985).
217. Horelick & Warner, supra note 159, at 9.
218. Id. at 14.
219. Id. at 15.
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Reagan-Gorbachev Geneva Summit: a 50 reduction in strategic arms and an
interim agreement on intermediate-range nuclear weapons. 220 In addition, the
negotiators had to consider the Soviet plan, which proposed a goal "for the
elimination of all nuclear weapons by the end of the century." 22 The SDI
negotiations made little progress in 1986. The U.S. remained determined that the
SDI research would continue. The Soviets continued to resist any concessions on
this issue.
222
In February 1986, the U.S. proposed the total elimination of longer range
intermediate-range nuclear forces (LRINF).223 The Soviets balked at this proposal
and accused the U.S. of "wanting something for nothing. ' 224 Progress at the
Geneva negotiating tables during the first half of 1986 remained modest and
tedious.
Throughout the early months of 1986, the U.S. and Soviet Union contem-
plated a second meeting of their leaders. The November 1985 meeting in Geneva
had done nothing to propel arms negotiations. 22 The Reagan Administration was
looking towards a second summit meeting as an opportunity to achieve substantial
progress. The Soviets were determined to walk away from the meeting with some
kind of concession from the United States on SDI, something they were unable
to do in Geneva.
226
Typical of the many previous setbacks in U.S.-Soviet relations, the Daniloff
affair threatened to sabotage the second summit meeting. 227 Despite the outrage
and propaganda that escalated after this incident, the U.S. and Soviet leaders
tried to proceed as planned, fearing a total breakdown in the negotiations
process. 228 On September 19, 1986, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
presented President Reagan with Gorbachev's invitation to a meeting in Reykjavik,
Iceland as an interim step towards a summit meeting in Washington. 229
220. President's Statement on Jan. 15, 1986 86 DEP'T ST. BULL. 27-28 (Mar. 1986). President
Reagan stated:
Our objective remains an agreement for 50% reductions, appropriately applied, in the
strategic nuclear arsenals of both the United States and Soviet Union and for enhanced
stability by reducing the capability to conduct a first strike.
Id. at 28.
221. President's Statement on Feb. 24, 1986, 86 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 64 (Apr. 1986). President Reagan
praised General Secretary Gorbachev's goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons. He
suggested that the two superpowers work towards this goal by first reaching a 50% reduction
in strategic nuclear forces as well as negotiating an INF Treaty. Id. The U.S. continued to
assert its "build-down" proposal in order to reach a 50% reduction in strategic weapons. One
disputed issue during the START negotiations involved the definition of "strategic weapons."
Remarks by Paul H. Nitze Before a Symposium at the Department of State's Foreign Service
Institute on March 13, 1986, 86 DEP'T ST. BULL. 50-51 (May 1986).
222. Id. at 51.
223. Id. at 52. The hope was to implement such a program as quickly as possible, while at the
same time maintaining U.S.-Soviet negotiating stability. Id.
224. Id. This accusation by the Soviets was made in 1981 at the opening of the INF negotiations
in Geneva. Id.
225. M. Mandelbaum S. Talbott, Reykjavik and Beyond, FOREIGN AFsAius 217-18 (1986/87).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 220-23. In retaliation for the arrest of a Soviet physicist on the United Nations staff,
the KGB framed and arrested a U.S. correspondent, Nicholas Daniloff, for the purchase of
state secrets.




Reagan welcomed the proposal, viewing the meeting, in some respects, as
providing a favorable publicity for the Republican party in the upcoming con-
gressional elections. 2-° On October 10, 1986, ten days after the resolution of the
Daniloff affair, Reagan and Gorbachev met in Reykjavik.
231
The two superpower leaders came to Reykjavik with very different objectives.
The issue of SDI's compliance with the ABM Treaty poisoned the atmosphere
at the meeting and lessened the hope for a concrete agreement between the
leaders. 23 2 As a result, the summit was seen by many as a failure. Neither side
emerged with a clear understanding on what, if anything, had been resolved.
2 a
Despite the Reykjavik hitch in the negotiating process, the superpower leaders
continued working towards a mutual arms control agreement. 23 4 Secretary Shultz
and Foreign Minister Shevardnaze met in Vienna in November to solidify the
positive steps made at Reykjavik and hammer out the unresolved issues. No
progress was made at this meeting.
23
INF
With the start of a new year, the Soviets seemed more eager to negotiate
and compromise. 23 6 The Soviets agreed to draft an INF treaty without linking or
conditioning that treaty on other agreements. The INF negotiations resumed in
Geneva on April 23, 1987.237
In July 1987, prospects for a mutual agreement on medium-range and short-
range missiles took an upward swing. Gorbachev announced in an interview that
the Soviet Union would be willing to accept the "global double-zero option.
238
As the negotiating process in Geneva continued into the summer, American
officials questioned whether a summit between the superpower leaders was
feasible. 239 The Soviets continued to reiterate that the elimination of the Pershing
I-A missiles in West Germany was a prerequisite to a U.S.-Soviet treaty. 240 While
concessions and compromises were steadily offered by both sides in Geneva, the
230. Id. at 223-24.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 228-29. Gorbachev demanded that research of space-based defensive systems be confined
to the laboratory. Reagan refused to accept any SDI restraints, reiterating his position that
SDI complied with the provisions of the ABM Treaty. Gorbachev also conditioned any INF
or START agreements on SDI restrictions. This concession was unacceptable to the Americans.
233. Id. at 224. Reagan expected the meeting to focus primarily on an INF agreement. Gorbachev
arrived with an uncompromising intent to work through a comprehensive agreement which
encompassed INF, START and SDI. Agreements were made to reduce strategic offensive arms
by 5001o over the next five years and limit LRINF missiles to 100 warheads. Statements on
November 12, 1986, by President Reagan and Ambassador Max M. Kampelman, Head of the
U.S. Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Arms Negotiations, 87 DEP'T ST. BULL. 41-42 (Jan.
1987).
234. 87 DEP'T ST. BULL. 32 (Mar. 1987).
235. Id.
236. 87 DEP'T ST. BULL. 18 (May 1987).
237. Id..
238. N.Y. Times, July 23, 1987, at 1, col. 6. The "global double-zero option" provided for total
elimination of medium-range and short-range missiles. Id. at 10, col. 1.
239. Id., July 17, 1987, at 1, col. 4.
240. Id., July 24, 1987, at 1, col. 2. Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany refused to commit
to a decision whether or not to modernize the Pershing I-As. Id. July 25, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
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seventy-two Pershing I-As remained a major obstacle. 241 The Soviets also contin-
ued to condition a strategic arms reduction agreement on the elimination of "Star
Wars."
242
Chancellor Helmut Kohl's announcement that West Germany would disman-
tle rather than modernize the Pershing I-As upon a U.S.-Soviet INF agreement
added strength to the negotiations in Geneva. The prospects of a treaty became
more of a reality. 243 The U.S. concessions regarding on-site inspections also
accelerated the negotiation process.
244
The September meetings of Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze in Washington, D.C., paved the way towards a meeting of the
superpower leaders. 245 Shevardnadze, in an address to the United Nations General
Assembly on September 23, 1987, reiterated the Soviet Union's commitment to
a successful U.S.-Soviet treaty and also to a withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Afghanistan, a human rights issue which frequently arose during the negotiations
process.
24 6
Although the superpowers worked steadily towards a successful INF treaty
during the fall of 1987, a number of obstacles remained. On September 20, 1987,
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee issued a report asserting that Senate
ratification of the proposed INF Treaty might be jeopardized by the Administra-
tion's insistence on a broad and permissive interpretation of the ABM Treaty.
247
The U.S.-Soviet compromise regarding the Pershing missiles, which the American
negotiators understood to have been resolved by the Shultz-Shevardnadze meetings
in September, was again at issue in Geneva in early October. 241 A purported
Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty caused concern among a number of Repub-
241. Id., July 29, 1987, at 1, col. 4. The U.S. agreed that the missiles and launchers involved in
the U.S.-Soviet Treaty would be eliminated rather than transferred to other countries.
Moscow agreed to abide by the "zero-zero" option and ban all intermediate-range missiles.
Id. at 2, col. 3.
242. Id., Aug. 1, 1987, at 3, col. 4. On July 13, 1987, the Soviets proposed a strategic arms plan
calling for a ceiling of 400 submarine-launched cruise missiles with a 400 mile range for both
the U.S. and Soviet Union.
243. Id., Aug. 27, 1987, at 1, col. 6. Modernization of the missiles whose nuclear warheads were
under U.S. control was scheduled for 1991.
Still at issue was whether the Bonn-U.S. commitment to the Pershing I-As would be included
in the proposed U.S.-Soviet treaty. The Soviets wanted the commitment included while the
U.S. argued that third parties should not be a factor in the treaty. Id., Sept. 14, 1987, at 1,
col. 6.
244. Id., Aug. 26, 1987, at 1, col. 3. The new proposal no longer required that inspectors be based
outside missile production and assembly sites. The provisions for surprise or challenge inspec-
tions were also modified.
245. Id., Sept. 17, 1987, at 1, col. 4. A significant compromise during these meetings involved the
Pershing I-A missiles. The American proposal provided that although the commitment to
eliminate the missiles would not be included in the text of the treaty, assurance of this
commitment would be included in a protocol accompanying the treaty. Id., Sept. 18, 1987, at
1, col. 6.
246. Id., Sept. 24, 1987, at 6, col. 6.
247. Id., Sept. 21, 1987, at 1, col. 6. Sen. Sam Nunn (D.-Georgia) stated that the Administration's
failure to adhere to a traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty might also prove to be a
major obstacle in the START negotiations. Id. at 12, col. 1.
248. Id., Oct. 9, 1987, at 1, col. 3. The Soviets, apparently in contradiction to the Pershing missile
compromise, insisted on maintaining a number of shorter-range missiles while the Pershing
missiles in West Germany were being eliminated.
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lican Senators and again cast doubt on ratification of the INF Treaty. 249
When Gorbachev stalled on setting a summit date and again reiterated
demands for the elimination of Star Wars , Secretary of State Shultz, in a
meeting with NATO foreign ministers on October 24, 1987, suggested that a
successful INF Treaty was possible without a summit meeting between the
superpower leaders. 250 The Soviets, however, shifted their position and agreed to
participate in an unconditional superpower summit as soon as possible. 251 On
October 31, President Reagan announced that Gorbachev had formally accepted
his invitation to attend a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in Washington scheduled
for December 7-10, 1987.252
During much of the month of November, the Geneva negotiators wrestled
with the remaining "verification issues. ' 253 On November 24, Secretary of State
Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze announced the completion of
the INF Treaty.254 Subsequently, the U.S. announced it would halt missile
deployment in Europe as soon as the INF Treaty was signed.
255
As the day approached for Gorbachev's arrival in Washington, President
Reagan received increasing criticism from conservatives who were skeptical of or
openly opposed the INF Treaty. 256 Two days before the summit meeting, dem-
onstrators gathered in Washington to protest restrictions placed on the emigration
of Soviet Jews.
257
Gorbachev arrived in Washington on December 7, optimistic about the U.S.-
Soviet step towards the reduction of nuclear forces, yet acutely aware of the
issues yet to be resolved. 251 On December 8, 1987, President Reagan and General
Secretary Gorbzchev signed the INF Treaty.
259
CONCLUSION
Much can be learned from a historical survey of the successes and failures
of the U.S.-Soviet arms negotiations. Social, economic, and political forces both
249. Id., Oct. 13, 1987, at 1, col. 3. The purported ABM Treaty violation involved two radars at
an electronics installation near Kiev.
250. Id., Oct. 25, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
251. Id., Oct. 28, 1987, at 1, col. 6. The Soviets agreed to follow through with a summit meeting
without a prior resolution of the "Star Wars" issue provided long range missiles and space-
based systems remained open to discussion. Id.
252. Id., Oct. 31, 1987, at 1, col. 6. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze brought President
Reagan a letter from General Secretary Gorbachev containing formal acceptance of the
invitation.
253. Id., Nov. 13, 1987, at 5, col. 1. The verification issue involved on-site monitoring of missile
producing plants in both the U.S. and Soviet Union. Id., Nov. 17, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
254. Id., Nov. 25, 1987, at 1, col. 6. The treaty provides for the elimination of roughly 1,500
warheads on Soviet medium and shorter-range missiles in exchange for the destruction of about
350 warheads on U.S. missiles. The treaty also outlines a detailed verification plan. Id. at 12,
col. 3.
255. Id., Nov. 26, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
256. Id., Dec. 5, 1987, at 6, col. 4. A major concern of the Administration was whether controversy
over the INF Treaty would result in a significant delay in the ratification process thereby
hampering negotiations for a strategic arms reductions treaty. Id.
257. Id., Dec. 6, 1987, at 1 col. 5. Roughly 200,000 demonstrators marched in D.C. on December
6, 1987. Id., Dec. 7, 1987, at I col. 6.
258. Id., Dec. 8, 1987, at 1, col. 6. Issues remaining unresolved between the superpowers include:
strategic arms reduction, "Star Wars," and conventional arms. Id. at 14, col. 1.
259. Id., Dec. 9, 1987, at 1, col. 3.
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reflect and shape the dynamics of strategic arms negotiations. Strong leaders,
with policy-making authority, are of paramount importance in developing effective
communications and productive U.S-Soviet negotiations.
The arms reduction attained by the INF Treaty is a triumph for Reagan-
Schultz-Gorbachev-Shevardnadze dialogue which directed the U.S. and Soviet
negotiators in Geneva. Strong parallels are evident between the INF and ABM
Treaties. The ABM Treaty negotiating team of Nixon and Kissinger likewise
cajoled the arms negotiating process, supplementing the Helsinki communications
and one-on-one bargaining to overcome impasses.
Arms reduction talks function as a safety valve, relieving tensions between
the superpowers in times of crisis. The Cuban missile incident demonstrated that
ongoing negotiations are necessary to avert the kind of unilateral decisionmaking
which could provoke nuclear confrontation.
Current arms reduction negotiations have expanded beyond the U.N. Atomic
Energy Commission's original goal of eliminating nuclear weapons inventories.
Present United States strategy in negotiating with the Soviet Union calls for
linking the arms negotiations to the resolution of other global conflicts, thereby
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